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ABSTRACT 
The author discusses the fate of the Foreign Intelligence Department of
the GDR, which he headed for over thirty years, and of its colleagues and
agents since the reunification of Germany ten years ago. There was no
transformation of this service after the implosion of socialism; instead, it
was liquidated, and criminal prosecutions followed which continue to this
day.  The author describes how this is connected to the West German
leadership goal of the "de-legitimization" of the GDR. The operations of
the western services are described, as well as the actions of their collabo-
rators, who agree to make available, for a price, their knowledge of
sources, files, data and other evidence in order for criminal prosecutions
to be launched; i.e. the "Rosewood" operation of the CIA, and the decod-
ing of the data carrier "SIRA" and its significance are discussed. The
author holds the view that the criminal prosecution of the colleagues and
agents of his service violates the internationally recognized legal concept
of "equality before the law". Of the approximately 150,000 political
indictments initiated since the reunification, 7,099 were for espionage.
The article also addresses other subjects, such as the inhumanely high
prison sentences in the United States. The author feels that, after ten
years, a political gesture should be made which would remove the last
vestiges of the Cold War.
Ten Years Later
When German unification became a reality on October 3,
1990, I had already been retired for four years. My first book had
been successfully published in 1989 in both German states and I
was a writer full of plans. After the appearance of my book in early
summer of 1989, at a time when the speedy disintegration of the
German Democratic Republic (GDR) could not have been pre-
dicted, the West German chief federal prosecutor, Rebman,
obtained an arrest warrant against me because of my position as
the former director of the Foreign Intelligence Department (HV A)
in the Ministry of State Security (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit -
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hereafter, MfS) of the GDR. I was at that time the only highly dec-
orated individual in the GDR and the only general of the Ministry
to which this honor was afforded. Thus, my creative existence as
a pensioner came to an end. The first seven years of German uni-
fication represented to me years of persecution, as well as years
of constant concern about co-workers and agents for whom I was
responsible during my time at the Ministry. Although the court
decisions, convictions, and probations that the victors of the Cold
War brought against me have now, ten years later, been suspend-
ed, the moral obligations toward the women and men who per-
formed their duties on the front lines remain. 
It is impossible to forget experiences which took place during
the Cold War confrontations, and the efforts in the East and West
to prevent a nuclear inferno. Now there are new experiences,
meetings which earlier would have been inconceivable, with for-
mer opponents from “the other side.” But concern for former “sol-
diers” who, unlike the agents of the West, are still subject to pros-
ecution, remains a heavy burden for me. Encounters with other
mostly retired colleagues from West and East, however, provide
hope. Therefore, I have agreed with pleasure to summarise for
“National Security and the Future” some thoughts about my for-
mer service and its fate after the German unification. 
Disintegration of the German Democratic Republic 
The last years of activity of the Foreign Intelligence
Department (HV A) of the GDR were shaped by the contradictory
developments in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev’s leadership,
and by the negative attitude of the Socialist Unity Party of
Germany (SED) leaders towards Perestroika and Glasnost in the
USSR. Some of the offices within the Ministry of National Security
responsible for the observation of the internal processes in the
GDR had difficulties objectively analysing the resulting phenome-
na, which invariably developed into political crises. These difficul-
ties soon became obvious to the offices of the foreign intelligence
service. However, these offices were focused on the possible con-
sequences of Gorbachev’s policies for the foreign policies of the
GDR, e.g., disintegration of the bloc confrontation; reorientation
with regard to the senseless, and for true socialism, economically
suicidal arms race; and the vision of a new millennium free of
nuclear weapons. Information coming from the HVA could there-
fore contribute to a better understanding of the western position in
Moscow and Berlin, and provide information about opponents of
the détente, armament control, and disarmament. Documentary
information from NATO-sources, for example, contributed in
1987 to the formulation of a new military doctrine of the Warsaw
Treaty. The attitude of many colleagues was hopeful, as they

























also in despair over the rigid attitude of the SED leaders, which
contradicted verbal assurances of friendship with the Soviet
Union. The increasing internal resistance in the GDR against these
rigid policies had serious consequences. In spite of efforts to sup-
port the expectations and tasks of the political leaders, MfS infor-
mation on the country’s internal situation reflected the internal
crises more realistically than in earlier years. 
The implosion of socialism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union in 1989/90 produced dramatic changes in all affected
countries. The special situation of the GDR consisted in the fact
that the ever present and influential “rich brother”, the Federal
Republic of Germany, was always ready to claim its “inheritance”.
One knows today (even I was late in recognising this) that the
GDR was simply a marionette for Gorbachev in a poker game for
power with the West, not a partner considered worthy of defend-
ing. Ruling circles in the Federal Republic of Germany (hereafter
FRG) jumped at this historical opportunity, and consequently
exploited it during the leadership of Chancellor Helmut Kohl. In
the last year of the GDR’s existence, the election campaign teams
of the West German parties controlled the field, and the Western
advisors of the last GDR government pushed in all areas toward
a speedy unification. In regard to foreign policy, there was no
resistance (excepting verbal) to the incorporation of the GDR into
NATO, and, therefore, the realignment of the German federal
armed forces and NATO onto the eastern boundaries of
Germany. Instead of initiating a reasonable process for the estab-
lishment of a European peace declaration, the agreements in
international law at the time (e.g., the so-called 2+4 treaty) were
dictated by the “victors”. The consequence for the GDR was that
it was incorporated into the FRG by means of a crash course,
which resulted in large losses for the majority of the GDR popula-
tion: economic status, loss of cultural specificity’s, social standing,
and personal biographical characteristics, as well as the persecu-
tion of VIPs, political and social discrimination, and disenfran-
chisement of the GDR elites. 
’Victors’  manipulation of the intelligence services
In contrast to other eastern and central European countries
and the USSR (later GUS states) there was no transformation of
the GDR intelligence service, but, rather, its radical liquidation. In
other countries, national interests required the preservation of the
defence and reconnaissance organs, so they were transformed
into agencies befitting the new political structures, which often
meant that structures which were relatively ideology-free were
taken over unchanged, including official and unofficial employ-

























databases.  Espionage, defence from terrorism, and personal pro-
tection were included in this process.  West Germany’s goal from
the onset was to destroy all GDR state structures, including the
intelligence service. This goal was given impetus by the anger and
hatred felt by a substantial proportion of the East German popu-
lation toward the MfS, a result of the failed national security poli-
cies of the SED and unjust repression executed by an oversized
security apparatus. A literal “Stasi hysteria” exists to this day, car-
ried forward from the former GDR.  The plan to remodel the secu-
rity organs into democratically-led reconnaissance and constitu-
tional protection agencies proved to be an illusion; the alternative
was the complete destruction of the entire MfS, including the
Foreign Intelligence Service, which was subsequently realised. This
was a logical consequence, considering the way in which the
overall integration of the GDR into the FRG had occurred.  There
was no discussion about transferring highly qualified employees
into the services of a united Germany nor interest in drafting a
new constitution for the new country which had emerged after the
unification. However, a draft of such a constitution had, in fact,
been prepared, in agreement with the citizens rights organisation
represented at the “Round Table”. 
But the West German “advisors” in the Ministry of the Interior
of the last GDR government had only one interest: to appropriate
as much “booty” as possible. This booty would include the names
of possible traitors among the MfS workers, documents, databas-
es, and information about sources, structures and modes of oper-
ation, material objects and technical equipment, and, above all,
evidence which could be used to prosecute citizens of the FRG
and employees of the MfS, based on MfS documents. Contrary to
these efforts, the citizens movement and government of the GDR
succeeded in early 1990 in reaching a decision to dissolve the
HVA, but in an orderly fashion.  A group of approximately 250
workers was empowered to systematically terminate the HVA activ-
ities and to destroy documents on HVA activities, excepting select-
ed documents intended for a central archive. Despite this
favourable decision benefiting GDR reconnaissance, intelligence
services of the FRG and other NATO countries, especially the
USA, succeeded in gaining important information about sources
and activities of the HVA. In 1989-90, they exploited the “politi-
cal climate” to launch substantial intelligence attacks against the
MfS of the GDR. Immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall
(November 1989), long before the unification, employees of the
BND (West German intelligence service), the Agency for the
Protection of the Constitution, and the Secret Services of the
United States and Great Britain made substantial attempts to
establish contact with employees or agents of the MfS. Using


























financial bribes (up to one million dollars), efforts were made to
pursued them to provide “voluntary” details concerning former
intelligence sources. Often they claimed that these employees’
superiors or other co-workers of the former department had
already co-operated and were now “driving a Mercedes”.  Only
a few, though some were, unfortunately, high-ranking officers, co-
operated as traitors with these western agencies. They revealed
many important sources and testified willingly in trials conducted
by the prosecution. Particularly spectacular was the 1990 CIA
operation “ROSEWOOD”, through which the CIA gained highly
secret HVA files and microfilm reports. Media reports up to the
present day have served to disinform and obscure the details of
this operation.  Some details from these documents were handed
over three years later and, after years of tug-of-war - 10 years
after the GDR ceased to exist - censored data about the various
personal files collected by the HVA were given to the FRG author-
ities and other NATO partners.  Due to superannuating, these
data can only be used for prosecution in a few insignificant cases.
But these HVA files still attract German media attention and are
continually exploited to incite waves of espionage hysteria. 
The “disclosures” about the supposedly recently decoded
data carriers SIRA containing information collected by the HVA
serve the same purpose.  The use or, rather, the misuse of this
information has thus far led only to the rehashing of well-known
and already concluded criminal processes, which have now
become the subject of political manipulation in Germany. Similar
use is being made in some western European countries of the
information in British Professor Chr. Andrews’ book about the omi-
nous Mitrochin Report and the highest officials of the KGB,
through further discrimination and open censure, and new waves
of lies, slander, and distortions. A proper historical judgement of
the security policies of the GDR under the influence of the Cold
War and the development of German-German post-war history
have thereby been blocked. The ruling circles in the FRG have
brutally applied their politically motivated versions of history to the
destruction of all GDR structures, including even discrimination
and prosecution of its elites. In this regard, the former Minister of
Justice (and former president of the foreign intelligence service)
Dr. Klaus Kinkel stated on German Judge’s Day, September 23,
1991, that: “I know very well that the courts alone cannot do all
the work which needs to be done.  But a substantial part of it must
be done by them.  There is no alternative.  I am counting on
German justice. We must succeed in de-legitimizing the SED
regime, which has to the bitter end justified itself by its antifascist
orientation, and its dedication to higher values and alleged
absolute humanity.  Meanwhile, under the guise of Marxist-


























cist Germany, a state that was defeated and that, rightfully, should
never be allowed to exist again.”
Criminalization of former agents and colleagues
At the international negotiations, the representatives of the
federal government had no apparent reaction to the warnings of
the Soviet negotiating partners not to pursue legal prosecution of
the “VIPS” in the GDR.  The reunification treaty provided that all
complaints against citizens of the FRG would be handled accord-
ing to the law in the GDR, which was in effect at the time the
alleged activity had occurred. In regard to any eventual prosecu-
tions of GDR espionage, massive political and legal doubts were
expressed in 1990 by several leading representatives of the fed-
eral government as well as respected academics; these activities
were categorised as “offences conditional to the division” whose
prosecution after unification was considered absurd. Dr.
Schauble, at the time Minister of the Interior and head negotiator
of the unification treaty stated:  “I cannot imagine that in a reuni-
fied Germany, we put erstwhile agents of the other side in prison.
What I also cannot imagine is that we put collaborators of the
GDR in prison and don’t do it the other way around. We are talk-
ing here about conditional offences that must be declared unpros-
ecutable.”  Similar statements were made by the former federal
president, Richard von Weizsacker:  “In cases where there
was…clear espionage, we must bear in mind that this was done
both on this side and the other side and, therefore, they must be
handled in a parallel manner.”
Nonetheless, in 1990 and the years following, a strange con-
stellation of political forces, members of the highest circles of the
Socialist Party of Germany (SPD) parliamentarians, thwarted a
legal regulation prohibiting the prosecution of spy activities for the
GDR. Abusing the binding regulations of the reunification treaty
concerning the application of GDR law, the federal German
courts formulated adventurous reconstruction’s – even in their
highest judicial decisions – in order to enable massive prosecu-
tions in the area of politics, military, judiciary and secret service of
those presumed responsible in the GDR.  Often, a simple judicial
ruling nullified the international principles of a constitutional state,
e.g., regulations on the superannuating of criminal offences.
Due only to widespread domestic and foreign protests,
inquiries by the uneasy lower courts to the federal constitutional
court resulted, in May 1995 (after almost all the processes against
agents and collaborators of the GDR had been completed), in a
decision by an outwardly close majority vote taken by this highest
Federal German court. In principle, the Constitutional Court pro-
hibited the further prosecution (with a few exceptions) of the head
officials of the foreign intelligence services of the GDR, but gave30
an unrestricted green light to the prosecution of sources of foreign
reconnaissance among the citizens of the old FRG.
A final survey by the federal prosecutor’s office showed that
since 1990, 7,099 cases had been initiated for espionage on
behalf of the GDR, of which 4,171 were citizens of the former
GDR and 2,928 citizens of the former FRG.  According to the
data, only 82 complaints against GDR citizens had been finally
filed, resulting in 23 convictions and 22 prison sentences (which
were partially suspended).  These numbers indicate the insubstan-
tiality of the complaints, but neglect to address the torment of
those affected and their families during these processes, which
lasted for years.  388 complaints were filed against citizens of the
former Federal Republic of Germany and 252 sentences were
passed.  Of those, 51 received sentences longer than two years.
In many cases (since 1994 nine), sentences of 9-12 years were
given for “treason”.  
More than 700 cases were partially suspended in lieu of mon-
etary fines up to 100,000 German marks.  The prosecuting
authorities of the Federal Republic of Germany point to the large
number of suspensions of processes due to lack of proof or min-
imal responsibility; that is, to the relatively high proportion of sus-
pended sentences, in order to prove their “humanitarian stance”
toward the prosecution of espionage for the GDR.  They are silent,
however, about the burdens which resulted for the accused, their
family members, and the witnesses who were exposed to police
and prosecutorial investigations, and about the social and finan-
cial burdens which arose due to court and attorney costs. 
The criminal prosecution for intelligence activities on behalf of
the GDR is classified with a general group of prosecutions of so-
called government and reunification crimes, for which a special
prosecutor as well as a special police apparat was formed.
Through these special government agencies, more than 100,000
people were processed.  The central processing authorities intro-
duced approximately 23,000 such cases and in each of the new
federal states, the number of preliminary proceedings was about
20,000 to 30,000; that is, an overall figure for the GDR of at
least 150,000 preliminary proceedings.  The treatment of MfS
employees and agents of the MfS was a significant chapter in the
process of incorporation of the GDR the FRG.
The reunification treaty of August 31, 1990 (Document 1,
Chapter XIX, Paragraph III, Number 5) contains a regulation for
special terminations of employment of individuals in public serv-
ice.  In addition to charges of violating basic human principles
and constitutional law, a further and more important justification
for special terminations of employees was if “they had been active
in respect to the former MfS”. If so, “the termination of employ-

























nation were consistently ignored and a priori every activity for the
MfS was used as grounds for termination.  This led to thousands
of terminations, all the way from employees in transportation serv-
ices, city sanitation, and landlords, to porters in schools and
museums and janitorial workers in health care institutions.  A
large number of highly qualified colleagues in these subordinate
positions of the MfS were terminated, true to the motto of the
changing GDR:  “Put Stasi to work” (Editor note: Stasi, State
Security Services). 
Specific forms of isolation and discrimination toward former
agents of the Ministry of State Security occurred as a result of the
activities of the “Federal Office in Charge of the Documents of the
State Security Service of the former GDR” (an agency which was
called the Gauck-office, after its director, Hans-Joachim Gauck,
a former pastor in Rostock). This agency acted as a tool of war in
order to continue the cold war by abusing the files and reservoirs
of the Ministry of State Security.  The subordination of this agency
to the Federal Ministry of the Interior is undemocratic, and violates
the will of the last Peoples’ Chamber of the GDR, which intended,
after motions for the establishment of such an agency were
passed, that it be subservient to an organ controlled by
Parliament.  Meanwhile, this agency grew to over 3,000 employ-
ees and a yearly budget of approximately 250 million marks.  A
particularly critical evaluation must be given to the dubious “pro-
fessional activities” of the Gauck office, due to its politically moti-
vated “pre-arrangement” of the available documents and the cor-
responding “judgements” on these materials.  These evaluations
and judgements were utilised as political instruments within the
context of the already cited “de-legitimisation” of the GDR, and
affected leading personalities of the left wing parties in Germany,
e.g., the fraction chairman of the Party of Democratic Socialism,
Dr. Gregor Gysi.
The unrestrained access enjoyed by the wealthy media institu-
tions and some representatives of the former civilian movements
to the “Gauck - Office” documents permitted the targeted abuse
of selected materials for political purposes.  This serves to contin-
ually inflame public opinion and leads - as in many other cases -
to a reversal of the burden of proof for those affected; after their
public defamation, they are then expected to prove their inno-
cence.  
After the Federal Constitutional Court prohibited criminal
prosecution of the head officials of the news service of the GDR
for espionage, the Federal Courts were forced to suspend the six-
year prison sentence they had already imposed on me in 1993.
The seven months long first process conducted against me in
Dusseldorf was a complete sham, since it was initiated at a time

























stitutional courts were investigating their legitimacy.  Certain of my
defence motions were rejected.  So that the criminal prosecution
would not have to be abandoned after the forced suspension of
the sentence, the case was sent back to the same court wherein
the first unconstitutional judgement had been passed.  The second
trial, which lasted until May of 1997, was a true farce.  This time,
charges were filed for “deprivation of freedom” in three of the
cases which dated back to the 1950s, in order to reach a com-
pletely absurd verdict based on GDR laws, by which the valid
superannuating could be ignored.  These cases were on such slip-
pery ground that even a high official of the Operations
Directorate of the Central Intelligence Agency reacted in a letter
to me, and I used his quote in my final summation:  “The ’kid-
napping’ charge, as presented by the authorities, is laughable –
any of us who were engaged in espionage during the Cold War
could be charged with the same ridiculous accusation.”  The sen-
tence which was brought after the five-month long trial was two
years probation, which meant a bitter defeat for the accusers.  I
could forget this sentence and the years that were robbed from me
and my family were it not for the criminal prosecutions and viola-
tions of the constitutional principle of “equality before the law”
which continue to this day, and for whose discontinuation I argued
in my final summary and still argue.
The FRG officials have enthusiastically rehabilitated - claiming
unjust political harassment - and provided generous compensa-
tions to properly and constitutionally sentenced spies, agents,
“handlers”, and terrorists - including criminals - who were
charged during the 40-year existence of the GDR.  The
Constitution of the FRG (Article 3, “equality before the law”) which
is a recognised norm of international law, has thereby been vio-
lated in the most profound manner.  Criminal prosecutions which
are to be found in every sovereign state are now subject to polit-
ical evaluations (espionage for the West is good and to be valued;
espionage for the East is bad and to be punished).  
Political gesture needed to remove vestiges of Cold War
Ten years after German state unification, the criminal prose-
cution of agents of GDR foreign intelligence continues, and there
are still instances of social degradation in the area of pensions,
chronic unemployment, and clear material penalties.  However,
this does not apply only to Germany.  In the USA and other NATO
states, people accused of having had contacts with GDR foreign
intelligence are being persecuted. Many of the prime agents of my
service are serving inhumanely high sentences in the USA. One
example is the Turkish citizen Hussein Yildirim, who was sentenced


























already served eleven years for an act which countless American
agents committed in our state.  These American agents of the
Cold War are all free.  In another case involving a very high sen-
tence, the American secret services illegally kidnapped in 1991 a
former member of the US Army, James Carney, who was then liv-
ing in Germany, returned him to the USA, and sentenced him to
a more than thirty-year term of imprisonment.  This was a true
case of kidnapping, in contrast to the cases attributed to me!
During my time at the head of the service, we were successful
in every case in freeing arrested officers and agents through
exchange operations.  The large number of Western agents
arrested in the GDR made this possible.  It was in part a very com-
plicated “ring action” in which attorneys, above all from the GDR,
FRG and the USA, were involved.  We are now deprived of this
possibility and, therefore, the only opportunity to rid myself of this
moral burden is to appeal to the American colleagues, – we are
still bound by mutual respect and with some, even a new friend-
ship has developed – to the American public, and the American
President, to close this not yet concluded chapter of the Cold War.
The President of the USA would lose nothing by pardoning the 72-
year-old Turkish citizen, Yildirim; in fact, he would benefit by mak-
ing this humanitarian gesture.
The thousands of men and women who have experienced
massive violations of basic principles of democracy and constitu-
tionality due to the way they, as former employees of the ministry
or agents, have been handled in the FRG, will not easily overcome
these violations.  This state of affairs also contributes to the ongo-
ing lack of German “inner unity” which the political public
deplores.
The former leaders of the Foreign Intelligence Department of
the GDR, as well as the former head of the Military
Reconnaissance of the National People’s Army of the GDR, there-
fore took the opportunity, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary
of German reunification, to send a letter to the German Federal
President, Johannes Rau, and once more call attention to the
necessity to implement the “equality before the law” regulations of
our Constitution in reference to the colleagues and sources of the
foreign intelligence services of the GDR.  The letter summed up
with the following: 
“In view of the historical roots of the rivalry between the two
Germanys, as well as the cessation of the East West confrontation,
could not a political gesture be made which would put an end to
the criminal prosecutions and social isolation in order to promote
a spirit of reconciliation? 
“We ask you, Honorable Mr. President, to use your high

























Such an act by the Federal Republic of Germany could be an
incentive for other countries, particularly the USA, to remove the
vestiges of the Cold War dating from the time of the bloc con-
frontation. It would serve at the same time to inhibit the continua-
tion of the Cold War in other forms, so that a more tolerant rela-
tionship between the states and peoples can be effected in the
future.
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